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Abstract
In many markets, empirical evidence suggests that positive production cost shocks are trans-
mitted more quickly and fully to ﬁnal prices than negative ones. This article explains asymmetric
price adjustment caused by ﬁrms imperfectly colluding on supra-competitive price levels. While
positive cost shocks are transmitted instantaneously, negative price adjustments only occur once
aggregate market demand turns out unexpectedly low. In equilibrium, this can be supported
whenever demand is suﬃciently stable, and negative cost shocks are not too large.
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1 Introduction
A vast body of empirical evidence documents that positive production cost shocks tend to be
transmitted more quickly and fully to ﬁnal prices than negative ones. For example, in a large
sample of 77 consumer and 165 producer goods, Peltzman (2000) ﬁnds that asymmetric price
adjustment (or rockets and feathers) can be observed in more than two thirds of the markets
he examined. Moreover, a multitude of individual empirical studies conﬁrm asymmetric price
adjustment in markets related to retail and wholesale gasoline, certain agricultural products, and
banking.1
Ever since the seminal paper of Borenstein et al. (1997), collusion has been mentioned as
one likely cause of the phenomenon. However, apart from few speciﬁc exceptions which will be
discussed below, no rigorous model of collusive asymmetric price adjustment to common (market-
wide) production-cost shocks has been provided. The aim of this paper is to ﬁll this gap in the
literature.
To this end, I provide a simple model of asymmetric price adjustment caused by ﬁrms imper-
fectly colluding on supra-competitive price levels. The main mechanism, which is inspired by an
informal discussion in Borenstein et al. (1997), works as follows. In the considered oligopolistic
market, ﬁrms would like to coordinate their prices on high levels, but a multiplicity of equilibria
and the prohibition of overt collusion renders coordination on arbitrary price levels impossible.
Instead, the ﬁrms use downward cost shocks as coordinating mechanism. Whenever a negative
cost shock hits the markets, they use the previous period's price as focal point for collusion, which
lets them achieve supra-competitive proﬁts during low-cost periods. Clearly, as this only requires
a passive pricing behavior of ﬁrms, the aforementioned coordination problem can be avoided. On
the other hand, the same logic does not prevail for positive cost shocks. Whenever a positive
cost shock occurs, the ﬁrms have no interest in sticking to a low price level, and increase their
prices immediately. Asymmetric price transmission results.
However, according to the above mechanism, negative cost shocks would never be transmitted
to ﬁnal prices if the ﬁrms' collusive scheme worked perfectly. This would be counterfactual to the
rockets-and-feathers pattern, which describes slowly falling prices following negative cost shocks.
I resolve this issue by introducing informational frictions. In particular, I assume that due to
substantial transaction costs (e.g., because of spatial distance or opportunity costs), the ﬁrms
1E.g., see Tappata (2009) for further references.
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ﬁnd it impractical to eﬀectively monitor their rivals' prices.2 Instead, with a lag of one period,
they observe their own demand, which provides an imperfect signal about the other ﬁrms' past
pricing. Hence, much in the spirit of Green and Porter (1984) and Tirole (1988), the ﬁrms
can only discourage proﬁtable deviations (in the sense of undercutting the collusive price) by
punishing unusually low demand.
Now, in order to explain downward price adjustment, I model each ﬁrm's demand as a con-
founded signal of the other ﬁrms' pricing and a random, unobservable aggregate demand level.
This ensure that collusion must eventually break down on the equilibrium path, as very low
demand levels have to be punished in order to make collusion sustainable. It follows that price
adjustments to negative cost shocks occur with a delay. This is in contrast to positive cost
shocks, which, by the previous argument, are transmitted instantaneously.
My main ﬁndings are as follows. First, in order for an equilibrium of this type to be sustain-
able, it is necessary that each ﬁrm's own demand provides a suﬃciently precise signal about the
other ﬁrms' pricing. This is always the case if the variance of the aggregate market demand is
suﬃciently low. Second, given that the ﬁrst property is satisﬁed, a suﬃcient equilibrium condi-
tion is that the size of the negative cost shock is not too large. Third, for any given probability
distribution of aggregate demand, asymmetric-pricing equilibria must break down as the number
of ﬁrms in the market grows large, ﬁrms highly discount future proﬁts, or the low-cost state
becomes less and less persistent. And ﬁnally, a downward price adjustment similar to the one
described in the empirical rockets-and-feathers literature can be generated when one considers
the case of multiple independently operating submarkets.
The theoretical literature on asymmetric price transmission caused by collusion is scarce.3
To the best of my knowledge, the earliest article was given by Damania and Yang (1998), who
set up a model of asymmetric price adjustment to ﬁrm-speciﬁc (idiosyncratic) demand shocks.
The intuition is that if a ﬁrm is in an implicit collusive agreement and experiences a negative
demand shock that is not faced (and observed) by other ﬁrms, it might be reluctant to reduce its
output price, as this may trigger a punishment phase. Because the reverse logic does not hold
for positive demand shocks, asymmetric price adjustment to demand shocks may be implied.
2All of the model's main qualitative results prevail if the ﬁrms can only sometimes observes their rivals' prices,
as long as this happens with suﬃciently low probability. Further details can be obtained from the author upon
request.
3Many other explanations for asymmetric pricing have been proposed. These include consumer search costs
(Yang and Ye (2008), Tappata (2009), Lewis (2011), Cabral and Fishman (2012)), menu costs (Ball and Mankiw
(1994)), lags in adjustment of production and ﬁnite inventories (Borenstein et al. (1997)), habit formation and
consumption inertia (Xia and Li (2010)), and Edgeworth price cycles that merely resemble asymmetric pricing
(Eckert (2002)).
2
However, their article cannot explain asymmetric price adjustment to market-wide cost shocks,
which is the principal focus of the empirical literature.
In an attempt to model the German electricity spot market, Wölﬁng (2008) considers the case
of collusive asymmetric price transmission in supply-function equilibrium. The market structure
Wölﬁng considers is special, as ﬁrms have to submit supply-functions rather than set prices
directly. On top of the limited applicability of this setup to traditional markets, the model cannot
endogenously generate negative price adjustment on the equilibrium path. This is because ﬁrms
have to coordinate on the fraction of a cost shock that is submitted to ﬁnal prices in each period,
and there is no reason why they should not collude perfectly (up to some maximal incentive
compatible level). This is in contrast to the present article, which endogenously explains price
transmission as coordination failure that must inevitably happen on the equilibrium path.
The most closely related theoretical work is given by Sherman and Weiss (forthcoming). In
order to match their empirical setting of a large outdoor market in Jerusalem, they model a spe-
ciﬁc market structure in which a horizontally diﬀerentiated isolated ﬁrm competes with several
homogeneous rival ﬁrms that compete à la Bertrand, and may engage in implicit collusion. The
crucial diﬀerence to the present model is a perfect observability of demand and prices, which
gives rise to contrasting empirical predictions. For example, colluding rival ﬁrms may instan-
taneously decrease their prices when costs decrease or aggregate market demand increases, as
under some parameter conﬁgurations, this implies that the maximally collusive scheme cannot be
supported anymore. In contrast, my model predicts downward price adjustment to negative cost
shocks as the result of punishment phases on the equilibrium path, which only happen following
severe negative demand shocks. Moreover, I impose less structure on the random demand distri-
bution, and do not consider an asymmetric market structure. Due to their diﬀerent motivation
and partly opposing testable predictions, both models should be viewed as complimentary to
each other.
Out of the ample empirical literature on asymmetric price adjustment, a number of studies
report a link between the estimated market power of ﬁrms and the degree of asymmetric price
adjustment in their market. For the retail gasoline market, these studies include Deltas (2008),
Verlinda (2008), and Balmaceda and Soruco (2008). For example, analyzing a wide panel of
state-level average retail prices for 48 US-American states, Deltas (2008) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
correlation between average retail markups (as a proxy for market power) and the severity of
asymmetric price adjustment. Similar results, based on proximity to rival stations and brand
identity as measures for market power, are reported by Verlinda (2008), who uses a disaggregated
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panel of station-level retail gasoline prices in Southern California. A comparable price-response
asymmetry can also be found in the banking sector. Analyzing the response of consumer deposit
interest rates to changes in the market interest rate, Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark
and Sharpe (1992) document that markets with a more concentrated banking sector are prone
to a higher degree of asymmetric pricing. In particular, the researchers ﬁnd that deposit interest
rates rise slower following an increase in the market interest rate if the market concentration is
high. This is the interest-rate analogue to the more traditional setting where prices rise faster
than they fall facing negative cost shocks. As market power typically facilitates collusion, all
of the mentioned articles suggest that collusion may play a non-negligible role in explaining the
rockets-and-feathers pattern.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model setup
and solves for the unique symmetric equilibrium of the stage game with arbitrary production
cost. In Section 3, a simple asymmetric-pricing strategy combination for an inﬁnitely repeated,
dynamic version of the stage game (with ﬂuctuating costs and demand) is constructed. Moreover,
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium existence are provided. Section 4 extends the
baseline model of Section 3 to the case of multiple separated submarkets, allowing for a more
realistic pattern of the pricing asymmetry. Section 5 concludes. Technical proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
2 Model Setup and Equilibrium of the Stage Game
Consider a market with N proﬁt-maximizing and risk neutral ﬁrms which compete over prices
pi (of some single homogeneous good produced) in a dynamic environment. Importantly, the
ﬁrms can never directly observe their rivals' prices, both in the current and all bygone periods.
Instead, with a lag of one period, ﬁrms observe their own demand, which provides an imperfect
signal about their competitors' past pricing.
Time is discrete, with t = 1, 2, .... In each period, all N ﬁrms face a common marginal cost ct.
For simplicity, I follow the majority of the theoretical literature on asymmetric price adjustment
by assuming that there are two cost states cH , cL, with cH > cL. These costs follow a two-state
Markov chain, where P(ct+1 = cH |ct = cH) = ρH ∈ (0, 1), P(ct+1 = cL|ct = cH) = 1 − ρH ,
P(ct+1 = cL|ct = cL) = ρL ∈ (0, 1), and P(ct+1 = cH |ct = cL) = 1 − ρL. Firms discount future
proﬁts with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
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The demand side is characterized by a continuum of identical consumers with a random
total mass θ˜t (henceforth called aggregate demand) that is drawn from a stationary probability
distribution F (θ) := P(θ˜t ≤ θ), where E(θ˜t) = 1, in each period. F is assumed to be twice
continuously diﬀerentiable over its support [0, θ], where θ > 1 may be inﬁnite.4 Moreover, for
every θ ∈ (0, θ), f(θ) := F ′(θ) > 0, which implies that there are no gaps in the aggregate-demand
distribution. As with prices, the ﬁrms are unable to observe θ˜t directly. Further conditions on
F will be discussed later in the analysis.
The consumers always prefer buying over not buying and the total market demand is perfectly
inelastic at each point in time. The (random) demand of ﬁrm i if it prices at pi and all other
ﬁrms price at some vector p−i = (p1, ..., pi−1, pi+1, ..., pN ) is given by
D˜i = θ˜ ∗ si(pi;p−i), (1)
where si(pi;p−i) is a function that maps a vector of prices to a market share si ∈ [0, 1] of the
aggregate demand θ˜. Since I will only consider symmetric equilibria in pure strategies, it is
suﬃcient to characterize si(pi; p, ..., p) := si(pi;p), where p is a price that is commonly chosen
by all ﬁrms other than i, as well as sj(p;p(pi)), where p(pi) denotes the price vector in which
the N − 2 ﬁrms other than j and i price at ﬁrm j's price p, and ﬁrm i 6= j charges pi. In order
to minimize technicalities, I focus on a linear demand speciﬁcation that can be seen as special
case of the well-known spokes model of non-localized spatial competition provided by Chen
and Riordan (2007). In particular, let the ﬁrms' market shares be given by5
si(pi;p) =
1
N
− α(pi − p) if pi ∈
[
p− N − 1
αN
, p+
1
αN
]
, (2)
sj(p;p(pi)) =
1− si(pi;p)
N − 1 , (3)
4Imposing zero as lower bound of the demand distribution implies that in any given period, the ﬁrms' demand
may be arbitrarily low. Later in the analysis, this will guarantee that all negative cost shocks must be transmitted
eventually, although prices may be very sticky downward.
5In the relevant variant of the spokes model, N ﬁrms are located at the endpoints of diﬀerent line segments
that have a common origin. The consumers are uniformly distributed along these segments, with the disutility of
purchasing at any given ﬁrm being proportional to the distance to the ﬁrm (consumers have to travel along the
line segments). Moreover, each consumer may only choose between purchasing at their preferred ﬁrm (which
is closest) and one random ﬁrm out of the N − 1 (equally distant) other ﬁrms. The considered market-share
function follows if N − 1 ﬁrms charge a common price p, and a single ﬁrm i charges some arbitrary price pi (as
long as pi is not too low  in the original spokes model, si(pi;p) can never exceed
2
N
).
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where α = α(N) > 0 may depend on N .6
This speciﬁcation summarizes the following ideas. First, if all ﬁrms price at some common
price level p, they split the aggregate market demand evenly. Second, if a ﬁrm unilaterally
deviates from a common price level, it receives a higher (lower) market share than its rivals if,
and only if, it prices lower (higher) than them. In the linear setup, the strength of the marginal
market-share response is given by α > 0 everywhere (where α may depend on N). And third,
given a unilateral deviation of ﬁrm i, all other ﬁrms share the residual demand evenly.7
Using this setup, it is straightforward to derive ﬁrm i's (unique) best response to any price
vector p that is commonly chosen by all other ﬁrms. In a symmetric equilibrium, this best
response must be equal to p. Doing so, I ﬁnd that the unique symmetric stage-game equilibrium
price is given by
p∗(c) = c+
1
αN
, (4)
with associated equilibrium proﬁts of
pi∗(c) = pi∗ =
1
αN2
. (5)
Note that the equilibrium price and proﬁts decrease with the degree of competition α and
the number of ﬁrms N . In the limit as either α or N goes to inﬁnity, each ﬁrm prices at marginal
cost and makes a proﬁt of zero. Moreover, the equilibrium price shifts one to one with the cost
level c, while the equilibrium proﬁts are independent of it.8 A direct implication is that a cost
shock of size ∆c is fully transmitted if and only if the ﬁrms' prices also shift by ∆c.
Finally, suppose that all ﬁrms price at some supra-competitive price level pˆ = p∗(c) + ∆,
where ∆ > 0. Then, ﬁrm i's incentive to marginally deviate is given by
∂
∂pi
[(pi − c)si(pi; pˆ)]
∣∣∣∣
pi=pˆ
= −α∆ < 0.
6If pi < p− N−1αN , ﬁrm i's price is so low relative to the other ﬁrms' price p that it captures the whole market:
si = 1. On the other hand, if pi > p+
1
αN
, ﬁrm i's price is so high that it does not attract any consumers: si = 0.
7All of the models' main results carry over to the case of non-linear demand as long as these properties are
preserved, under the additional assumptions that
∂si(pi;p)
∂pi
∣∣∣
pi=p
= −α(N) < 0 ∀i, p, and that a stage-game
equilibrium exists for c ∈ {cL, cH}. The ﬁrst additional assumption means that each ﬁrm's market share response
following a marginal deviation from a common price vector p is constant in the price level p. This is consistent
with markets in which consumers only care about absolute price savings.
8The latter two features are preserved in the non-linear-demand case as long as
∂si(pi;p)
∂pi
∣∣∣
pi=p
=
− α(N) < 0 ∀i, p (see also the previous footnote).
6
Thus, each ﬁrm has an incentive to (marginally) undercut, and this incentive increases in the
competition intensity α and the premium over the competitive price level ∆.
3 Equilibrium of the Dynamic Game
In the stage game, each ﬁrm has an incentive to lower its price, starting from a collusive price
level pˆ > p∗(c). The goal of this section is to provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
collusion on supra-competitive price levels to be feasible, given the stochastic nature of aggregate
market demand and costs, as well as the ﬁrms' inability to directly observe their rivals' prices.
Unfortunately, due to the various folk theorems that have been proven in the literature
(see, e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)), it is well-known that any repeated game gives rise to
an inﬁnite number of subgame-perfect equilibria, provided that the players' (common) discount
factor is suﬃciently close to one. In order to proceed with the analysis, I ignore equilibria in
which the ﬁrms coordinate on arbitrary price levels that have never been played in previous
periods, and which do not correspond to any stage-game equilibrium. While this assumption
is restrictive, it seems plausible that  in the absence of any communication  ﬁrms would ﬁnd
it diﬃcult to select an arbitrary equilibrium out of the inﬁnitely many equilibria that can be
played. On the other hand, continuing to charge the same price after a negative cost shock has
happened is a simple and intuitive way of increasing any ﬁrm's proﬁt, provided that its rivals do
not adapt their prices either. In some sense, past price levels provide a natural focal point for
collusion.9
Hence, in what follows, I will focus on equilibria where the ﬁrms employ a simple mechanism
in order to enforce collusion on supra-competitive past price levels. Once a negative cost shock
hits the market such that the marginal production cost drops from cH to cL, the ﬁrms keep
pricing on the supra-competitive price level p∗(cH) as long as their demand exceeds some critical
threshold k in each period. If the ﬁrms' demand falls short of k, they enter a punishment phase
in which they charge the Nash-equilibrium price p∗(cL) of the low-cost stage game until the next
opportunity for coordination arises.
More precisely, I consider symmetric equilibria in which each ﬁrm plays the following strategy.
1. Price at p∗(cH) whenever c = cH . (High-Cost Phase H)
9See Schelling (1960) for a seminal treatment of focal points.
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2. If c = cL and demand has exceeded k in every period since c last switched from cH to cL,
price at p∗(cH). (Collusive Phase C)
3. If c = cL and demand has fallen short of k in some period since c last switched from cH to
cL, price at p
∗(cL). (Punishment Phase P)
If an equilibrium of such a structure can be found, it must exhibit asymmetric price transmis-
sion. A downward cost shock from cH to cL is not transmitted instantaneously to ﬁnal prices,
as the ﬁrms keep pricing on p∗(cH) until demand turns out unexpectedly low. Only in that
case (which takes at least one period, as demand is observed with a lag), a punishment phase is
entered in which the ﬁrms reduce their prices to the equilibrium level p∗(cL) of the stage game
with low costs. On the other hand, upward cost shocks from cL to cH are either transmitted
immediately (if the ﬁrms are currently in the punishment phase and price competitively), or not
at all (if the ﬁrms are currently in the collusive phase, i.e., a downward cost shock has never been
transmitted). In particular, if the low cost state is suﬃciently persistent such that an upward
cost shock typically happens when the collusive phase has already ended, the well-documented
rockets-and-feathers pattern emerges.10
I will now start to analyze equilibria of the described type. First, note that each ﬁrm's
behavior is clearly optimal in both the high-cost phase and punishment phase. Given that all
other ﬁrms price at p∗(cH) in the high-cost state (p∗(cL) in the low-cost state) no matter what
happens (and given that an individual ﬁrm cannot inﬂuence when the high-cost or punishment
phase ends), a ﬁrm can do no better than by playing the stage-game best response p∗(cH) (p∗(cL))
itself.
The non-trivial part of the suggested strategy-combination is the collusive phase. As collusion
on the supra-competitive price level p∗(cH) in the low-cost state cL should be sustainable, each
ﬁrm has to be deterred from proﬁtably undercutting its rivals (and obtaining a larger market
share). As the ﬁrms are unable to observe their rivals' price choices directly, the simplest way
to do so is by adequately punishing unexpectedly low demand. Doing so, the demand threshold
k must necessarily be chosen in such a way that each ﬁrm's expected increase in proﬁts by
marginally undercutting p∗(cH) is exactly oﬀset by an expected loss of proﬁts due to a higher
probability of collusion to end.
10Moreover, from an outside perspective, the high-cost state is always associated with high prices, whereas the
low-cost state is only sometimes associated with low prices.
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Let r(pi;p; k) denote the probability that any ﬁrm j's demand exceeds k, given that all ﬁrms
j 6= i price at p and ﬁrm i prices at pi. It is then easy to see that11
r(pi;p; k) = 1− F
(
(N − 1)k
1− si(pi;p)
)
, (6)
whereas
r(p;p; k) = 1− F (Nk). (7)
As si(pi;p) decreases in pi and is equal to
1
N for pi = p, it can be seen that r(pi;p; k) < r(p;p; k)
for pi < p (as long as k > 0, that is, any positive punishment threshold is used). Hence, a ﬁrm
that deviates downward from the collusive price level p∗(cH) does in fact decrease the probability
of collusion to be continued in each period. It is crucial to characterize how k must be chosen in
order to ensure that a marginal deviation form the collusive price does not pay.
Next, denote by ΠHi , Π
C
i (pi), and Π
P
i ﬁrm i's expected discounted proﬁt stream (given the pro-
posed strategy for all other ﬁrms) in the high-cost phase, collusive phase, and punishment phase,
respectively. Note that ﬁrm i's expected discounted proﬁt stream of the collusive phase ΠCi (pi)
has ﬁrm i's collusive-phase price pi as argument.
12 Only if ﬁrm i's total expected discounted
proﬁt is maximized for pi = p
∗(cH), the proposed strategy-combination forms an equilibrium.
The following recursive equations then deﬁne ﬁrm i' expected discounted proﬁt stream in
each of the three regimes (where pii(pi) is a short notation for (pi − cL)si(pi;p∗(cH)) and r(pi)
is a short notation for r(pi;p
∗(cH); k)).
ΠHi = pi
∗ + ρHδΠHi + (1− ρH)δΠCi (pi) (8)
ΠCi (pi) = pii(pi) + ρL
[
r(pi)δΠ
C
i (pi) + (1− r(pi))δΠPi
]
+ (1− ρL)δΠHi (9)
ΠPi = pi
∗ + ρLδΠPi + (1− ρL)δΠHi . (10)
The ﬁrst and third of these equations have a similar structure. The expected discounted
proﬁt stream of the high-cost phase (punishment phase) is given by the sum of the phase's
expected stage-game proﬁt and the one-time discounted expected continuation proﬁt. With
probability ρH (ρL), costs stay the same in the high-cost state (low-cost state), which gives rise
to an expected continuation proﬁt that is equal to the initial expected discounted proﬁt stream.
11The ﬁrst equation follows because r(pi;p; k) := P
(
θ˜ ∗ sj(p;p(pi)) > k
)
= P
(
θ˜ ∗ 1−si(pi;p)
N−1 > k
)
=
1− F
(
(N−1)k
1−si(pi;p)
)
. This directly implies r(p;p; k) = 1− F (Nk), as si(p;p) = 1N .
12Since the collusive phase is stationary, it suﬃces to consider one single price pi that ﬁrm i chooses in every
period of that phase.
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With probability 1 − ρH (1 − ρL), costs switch to the other state, which leads to an expected
continuation proﬁt that is equal to the expected discounted proﬁt stream of the collusive phase
(high-cost phase).
The second equation has the following interpretation. The expected discounted proﬁt stream
of the collusive phase, given that ﬁrm i prices at pi in each stage of that phase, can be written
as the sum of the expected stage-game proﬁt of pricing at pi (while all other ﬁrms stick to
the plan of pricing at p∗(cH)) and the one-time discounted expected continuation proﬁt. This
continuation proﬁt has two parts. With probability ρL, costs stay low. Then, depending on
whether the previous period's demand has exceeded k or not (which happens with probability
r(pi) and 1 − r(pi), respectively), the expected continuation proﬁt is either given by the initial
expected discounted proﬁt stream, or the expected discounted proﬁt stream of the punishment
phase. With probability 1− ρL, costs switch to the high state. Then, the expected continuation
proﬁt is equal to the expected discounted proﬁt stream of the high-cost phase.13
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the underlying dynamical system if ﬁrm i
prices at pi in every period of the collusive phase.
It was already discussed above that the ﬁrms only face a non-trivial pricing decision when
the game is in the collusive phase. Clearly, continuing to price at p∗(cH) in the collusive phase
is a best response to all other ﬁrms' strategies if, and only if, p∗(cH) is a global maximizer of
ΠCi (pi). Solving the above system of equations, the following lemma can be stated.
Lemma 1. Firm i's expected discounted proﬁt stream in the collusive phase, given that all other
ﬁrms price according to the proposed strategy, can be written as
ΠCi (pi) =
pi∗
1− δ +
(1− δρH)(1− δρL)
(1− δ) [1 + δ − δ(ρH + ρL)] ×
pii(pi)− pi∗
1− δρLr(pi) . (11)
The interpretation to Lemma 1 is straightforward: the expected discounted proﬁt stream of
pricing at pi in every period of the collusive phase is given by the expected discounted proﬁt
stream pi
∗
1−δ of receiving the (competitive) stage-game equilibrium proﬁt in every period, plus
the expected excess proﬁt over the competitive proﬁt in collusive periods, pii(pi)− pi∗, properly
discounted.
13A diﬀerent way of writing down equation (9) is as follows: ΠCi (pi) =∫ (N−1)k1−si(pi)
0
[
pii(pi)θ˜ + ρLδΠ
P
i + (1− ρL)δΠHi
]
f(θ˜)dθ˜ +
∫ θ
(N−1)k
1−si(pi)
[
pii(pi)θ˜ + ρLδΠ
C
i (pi) + (1− ρL)δΠHi
]
f(θ˜)dθ˜,
where the bound
(N−1)k
1−si(pi) is the necessary aggregate demand level that is needed for sustained collusion, given
pi and k. As r(pi) = 1− F
(
(N−1)k
1−si(pi;p)
)
, it is easy to see that both formulations are equivalent.
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P
ρH
ρLr(pi)
ρL(1− r(pi))
1− ρH 1− ρL
ρL
1− ρL
cH
cL
cL
Figure 1: Depiction of the dynamical system that is implied if ﬁrm i charges pi in the collusive
phase, given the proposed strategy-combination of all other ﬁrms. Transition probabilities are
found next to the arrows indicating a state change.
Examining equation (11), it is apparent that ΠCi (pi) reaches its global maximum at the value
of pi that maximizes Πˆi(pi) :=
pii(pi)−pi∗
1−δρLr(pi) . In order for the proposed strategy-combination to form
an equilibrium, this maximum must be reached at p∗(cH). A necessary condition for this is that
the derivative of Πˆi(pi), evaluated at p
∗(cH), is equal to zero. Carrying out the corresponding
calculation, one arrives at the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (Necessary condition) In order for the proposed strategy-combination to form
an equilibrium, the demand threshold k must be chosen such that φ := Nk satisﬁes
h(φ) := (N − 1) [1− δρL + δρLF (φ)]− δρLφf(φ) = 0. (12)
The intuition to equation (12) is a simple marginal-cost marginal-beneﬁt tradeoﬀ. If a ﬁrm
marginally deviates downward from the collusive price level p∗(cH), it makes a higher-stage game
proﬁt in expectation (as the best response to all other ﬁrms pricing at p∗(cH) is to price lower
than p∗(cH)), but this comes at the cost of a higher probability of collusion to end after each
period, which decreases the expected length of collusive-phases with supra-competitive proﬁts.
In particular, as the marginal cost of undercutting the collusive price level is proportional to
φf(φ), one can see that the above ﬁrst order condition can only be satisﬁed for adequately chosen
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demand thresholds φ∗ = Nk∗ if the probability density of aggregate market demand is suﬃciently
large somewhere in its distribution. Only if that is the case, the probability of sustained collusion
following a marginal price decrease can be reduced by so much (when choosing k appropriately)
that the ﬁrms are successfully discouraged from deviating.
In fact, examining h′(φ) = δρL [(N − 2)f(φ)− φf ′(φ)] and noting that h(0) > 0, it is appar-
ent that the necessary condition can never be fulﬁlled if f is non-increasing (F is weakly concave).
This rules out some common cumulative distribution functions, including the uniform, exponen-
tial, and Pareto distribution. The interpretation is that these distribution functions provide too
weak signals about the ﬁrms' pricing in order to discourage marginal deviations. No matter how
the demand threshold k is chosen, ﬁrms can never be deterred from proﬁtably undercutting the
collusive price level, as doing so reduces the probability of sustained collusion by too little.
Note moreover that for any given aggregate-demand distribution F , it directly follows from
equation (12) that as N increases without bound or δρL decreases towards zero, the ﬁrst order
condition must eventually be violated. Hence, an asymmetric-pricing equilibrium of the analyzed
structure can only be supported if there are not too many ﬁrms in the market, ﬁrms do not highly
discount future proﬁts, and the low-cost state is suﬃciently persistent.
So far, only a necessary condition in order to allow the collusive price level p∗(cH) to be a
local extremum of the expected discounted proﬁt stream of the collusive phase has been provided.
However, in order to make pricing at p∗(cH) a best response to the other ﬁrms' strategies, it has
to hold that this price is a global maximizer of ﬁrm i's expected discounted proﬁt stream in the
collusive phase. The following proposition provides a suﬃcient condition for that.
Proposition 2. (Suﬃcient Condition) The proposed strategy combination forms an equilibrium
(p∗(cH) is a global maximizer of Πˆi(pi)) if a solution to the necessary condition in equation (12)
exists, and ∆c := cH − cL is suﬃciently small.14 In particular, the former is true whenever the
variance of aggregate market demand is suﬃciently low, that is, V ar(θ˜) < ( 3
6+16N−1δρL
)2.
Thus, asymmetric pricing equilibria exist whenever the variance of aggregate market demand
is low relative to the market parameters N , δ and ρL, given that the size of the negative cost
shock is not too large. In particular, the suﬃcient bound for the variance becomes less stringent
(larger) for a lower number of ﬁrms, a higher discount factor, and a higher persistence of the
low-cost state. Moreover, it can be seen that a wide range of plausible distribution functions for
modeling stochastic aggregate market demand, e.g. the Log-normal, Gamma, Beta, Log-logistic,
14Explicit suﬃcient conditions on ∆c can be found at the end of the proof of the proposition.
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and Weibull distribution, give rise to the existence of asymmetric-pricing equilibria, provided
that their variance is suﬃciently low. This is because all of these distribution functions can be
normalized in such a way that their expectation is set to one, with a free parameter governing
their variance.
The intuition to the above proposition is twofold. First, a suﬃciently low variance of aggre-
gate market demand guarantees that marginal deviations from the collusive price level are not
proﬁtable when the demand threshold k is set properly, as the probability of sustained collusion
decreases by too much. And second, also larger deviations from the collusive price level do not
pay if the size of the cost shock is suﬃciently small. This is because, for a small negative cost
shock, the collusive price level lies close to the (new) competitive price level, implying that large
deviations from the collusive level cannot pay.
Having established the existence of an asymmetric-pricing equilibrium under suitable model
parameters, it is now possible to quantify the degree of asymmetry in price adjustment. For this,
note that for any solution φ∗ = Nk∗ of equation (12) that does in fact constitute an equilibrium,
the probability of the collusive phase to end, conditional that costs remain low, is given by F (φ∗)
in each period. Thus, following a persistent negative cost shock, the expected number of periods
until prices adjust from p∗(cH) to the lower competitive level of p∗(cL) is given by
L(φ∗) =
1
F (φ∗)
> 1.15 (13)
On the other hand, by construction, positive cost shocks are transmitted instantaneously,
given that the ﬁrms were pricing at the competitive level p∗(cL) before.
Finally, the implicit equation (12) also allows for comparative statics with respect to the
ﬁrms' discount factor δ and the persistence of the low-cost state ρL. The following proposition
is a direct consequence of the implicit function theorem.
Proposition 3. A marginal increase in δ or ρL leads to a more pronounced asymmetry in price
transmission if, and only if, h′(φ∗) is negative.
Proposition 3 shows that the eﬀect of a marginal increase in δ or ρL is directly related to
the sign of h′(φ∗). This sign is ambiguous, as in the case of multiple equilibria, it may depend
on the chosen equilibrium demand threshold. In particular, it can be the case that as ﬁrms
become more patient or negative cost shocks become more persistent, negative cost shocks are
15This expectation follows from a well-known property of geometrically distributed random variables.
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transmitted more quickly to ﬁnal prices.16 Also, it should be noted that comparative statics with
respect to N cannot be provided for general demand distributions F , as the implicit function
theorem does not work for discrete parameters.
4 Multiple Submarkets
In the baseline model developed in Sections 2 and 3, I considered the case of a single oligopolistic
market in which a small number of ﬁrms engages in imperfect collusion on supra-competitive
price levels. Under suitable model parameters, the proposed trigger-sales strategy combination
forms an equilibrium in which asymmetric price transmission to cost shocks is the outcome.
However, the baseline model is counterfactual to the rockets-and-feathers pattern in the sense
that once collusion breaks down, all prices adapt fully and abruptly to the lower competitive
level. In contrast, empirical evidence documents slowly declining prices after the occurrence of
negative cost shocks.
The purpose of this section is to reconcile the theoretical model with the patterns that
are found in the data. The main argument is that the price series that are typically studied
in the literature are not station-speciﬁc, but reﬂect average retail prices in a large market,
which may be comprised of several independently operating local submarkets. Hence, due to the
stochastic nature of demand, collusion on supra-competitive price levels may persist longer in
some submarkets than others. This implies that time series of market-wide average retail prices
should be slowly declining following negative cost shocks.
Let M ≥ 1 denote the total number of locally separated submarkets, with Nm and αm
(m ∈ {1, ...,M}) referring to the total number of ﬁrms Nm and competition intensity αm in
submarket m, respectively. The discount factor δ is assumed to be constant across submarkets.
Moreover, for simplicity, let the random aggregate-demand variable θ˜m be distributed inde-
pendently across submarkets, with Pr
(
θ˜1 ≤ θ1 ∧ ... ∧ θ˜M ≤ θM
)
=
∏M
m=1 Fm(θm) in each period
(the probability distribution of the stochastic demand variable is allowed to diﬀer across sub-
markets).
The stochastic cost process for the whole market follows the same rules as in the baseline
model. That is, the market-wide production costs stick to the high-cost level cH (low-cost level
cL) with probability ρH (ρL) after each period.
16It has to be noted though that in all numerical simulations I undertook, equilibria with positive h′(φ∗) were
accompanied by equilibria with negative h′(φ∗∗), for some φ∗∗ < φ∗. Hence, as equilibria with a lower φ give rise
to higher expected ﬁrm proﬁts, equilibria with positive h′(φ) were always Pareto-dominated.
14
Now, given this setup, submarket m will face a ﬁrst order condition of
(Nm − 1) [1− δρL + δρLFm(φ)]− δρLφfm(φ) = 0.
Submarkets in which at least one solution φ∗m to the above equation exists will ﬁnd it optimal
to stick to the collusive price level p∗m(cH) := cH +
1
αmNm
following a negative cost shock, given
that cH − cL is not too large relative to the respective submarket's parameters.
Suppose L ≤M of the submarkets are in a collusive equilibrium (using some speciﬁc demand
threshold Nmk
∗
m = φ
∗
m), and without loss of generality, label them with 1, ..., L. Then, following
a persistent negative cost shock, the probability that any subset S ⊆ {1, ..., L} of these ﬁrms will
still charge the high price p∗m(cH), t periods after a negative cost shock has happened, is given by∏
m∈S (1− Fm(φ∗m))t. In particular, this shows that the probability that any given subset S of
the colluding ﬁrms will still price high t periods after a persistent negative cost shock is strictly
decreasing in t.
Unfortunately, in the case of heterogeneous submarkets, it is not practical to explicitly derive
the corresponding probability H(l, t) that some number of ﬁrms l ≤ L continue to price collu-
sively t periods after a persistent negative cost shock has happened. For analytical purposes,
I will subsequently consider the case in which all of the M ≥ 1 submarkets are identical and
characterized by a common probability γ := 1 − F (φ∗) that collusion is continued after each
period of the collusive phase. In turn, this implies that the probability that any given submarket
will still be in the collusive phase t periods after a persistent negative cost shock has happened
is equal to γt.
Then, given that each submarket is independent from all others, the probability J(m, t) that
exactly m ≤ M of all submarkets will still be in the collusive phase t periods after a negative
cost shock has occurred follows a binomial distribution, where
J(m, t) :=
(
M
m
)
(γt)m(1− γt)M−m. (14)
By a well-known property of binomially distributed random variables, the expected number
of ﬁrms who continue to price collusively t periods after a persistent negative cost is given by
Mγt, which decreases exponentially in t. Hence, the expected average retail price of the whole
market, t periods after a persistent negative cost shock has happened, can easily be calculated.
The following proposition highlights this ﬁnding.
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Figure 2: Density function of a log-normal distribution with mean-parameter −0.08 and
standard-deviation parameter 0.4, implying a mean of 1. Given the selected parameters, the
aggregate demand threshold φ∗ is located at the dashed line.
Proposition 4. Suppose the whole market is comprised of M ≥ 1 independently operating
submarkets, each characterized by a probability γ > 0 that collusion is continued after each period
of the collusive phase. Then, the expected average retail price of the whole market, t periods after
a persistent negative cost shock has occurred, is given by
p∗(cH)γt + p∗(cL)(1− γt). (15)
For large M , a smooth transition from the collusive price level p∗(cH) to the new competitive
price level p∗(cL) can be observed.
In the following, I will present a numerical simulation of the extended model. For this, let
the parameters of the whole market be given by M = 50, cH = 20, cL = 16, δ = 0.9999,
ρH = ρL = 0.98. Moreover, for each submarket, let N = 4, α = 0.05, and F (θ) log-normal
with mean-parameter −0.08 and standard-deviation parameter 0.4. The latter implies a mean of
the aggregate market demand random variable of 1 (as required by the model) and a standard
deviation of roughly 0.417. See Figure 2 for a depiction of the corresponding probability density
function f(θ).
It is now easy to see that p∗(cH) = 25 and p∗(cL) = 21. Also, one can verify numerically
that φ∗ = Nk∗ = 0.406724 is a solution to the ﬁrst order condition stated in Proposition 1. As
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p∗(cH) is also a global maximizer of ΠCi (pi) for φ = φ
∗,17 this implies that asymmetric pricing
can be observed in equilibrium. In fact, if all ﬁrms stick to the punishment threshold φ∗, there
is a probability of 1 − F (0.406724) ≈ 0.979771 that collusion is continued after each period of
the collusive phase.
Figure 3 depicts a simulation of the outlined market for a length of 500 periods (days).18
The well-documented rockets-and-feathers pattern can clearly be discerned.
5 Conclusion
In a wide range of markets, positive production cost shocks are transmitted more quickly and
fully to ﬁnal prices then negative ones. This article provides a simple model of asymmetric price
transmission caused by ﬁrms imperfectly engaging in tacit collusion. In the model, negative cost
shocks are only transmitted to ﬁnal prices once collusion breaks down. This happens when an
unobservable aggregate-demand variable turns out unexpectedly low, which typically occurs with
a delay. On the other hand, positive cost shocks are transmitted instantaneously, as the ﬁrms
have no interest in sticking to lower than competitive prices.
By considering a simple trigger-sales strategy according to which ﬁrms punish unusually
low demand, I prove that asymmetric-pricing equilibria exist whenever the variance of aggregate
market demand is suﬃciently low and the size of negative cost shocks is not too large. Conversely,
I show that the considered equilibrium can only exist if there are not too many ﬁrms in the
market, low-cost states are relatively persistent, and the ﬁrms discount the future by not too
much. Moreover, in order to discourage marginal deviations, it should not always be the case
that low aggregate demand levels are more probable than high levels. Since all of these features
can be examined empirically, a rich array of testable predictions is generated.
Future research might extend the simple model to a more general class of random cost pro-
cesses, allow the ﬁrms to endogenously monitor their rivals' prices, or consider the case of asym-
metric market shares. However, already the current model can generate pricing patterns that are
close to the ones observed in the data, given that multiple separated submarkets are considered.
The most important agenda is hence to analyze the various predictions of the model empiri-
cally and contrast them with those of other theoretical models of asymmetric price adjustment.
In particular, if the portrayed collusive mechanism causes the phenomenon, it should be observed
17A ﬂexible Mathematica-code to perform numerical simulations like this can be obtained from the author upon
request.
18The underlying R-code (alternatively, pseudo-code) can be obtained from the author upon request.
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Figure 3: Market simulation for T = 500, M = 50, cH = 20, cL = 16, δ = 0.9999, ρH = ρL =
0.98, and for each submarket, N = 4, α = 0.05, F (θ) log-normal with mean-parameter −0.08 and
standard-deviation parameter 0.4. The black solid (gray solid) [dashed] line represents the whole
market's actual average retail price (expected average retail price) [marginal cost], respectively.
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that prices tend to adjust downward in low-demand periods, and that markets with more sta-
ble aggregate demand, more persistent negative cost shocks, and fewer ﬁrms, are more likely to
exhibit the rockets-and-feathers pattern.
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6 Appendix: Technical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. First, use equations (8) and (10) in order to solve for ΠHi and Π
P
i as functions
of ΠCi (pi). This yields
ΠHi =
pi∗ + (1− ρH)δΠCi (pi)
1− δρH
and
ΠPi =
pi∗[1 + δ − δ(ρH + ρL)]
(1− δρL)(1− δρH) +
(1− ρL)(1− ρH)δ2
(1− δρL)(1− δρH)Π
C
i (pi).
Next, insert the above expressions into equation (9), isolate ΠCi (pi) and multiply both sides with
(1− δρL)(1− δρH) in order to get
ΠCi (pi)
[
(1− δρLr(pi))(1− δρL)(1− δρH)− δ3ρL(1− ρL)(1− ρH)(1− r(pi)) −
δ2(1− ρL)(1− ρH)(1− δρL)
]
=
pii(pi)(1− δρL)(1− δρH) + pi∗δρL(1− r(pi)) [1 + δ − δ(ρH + ρL)] +
pi∗δ(1− ρL)(1− δρL).
Simplify the squared brackets to the right of ΠCi (pi) and add and subtract
pi∗(1− δρL)(1− δρH) to the RHS to obtain
ΠCi (pi) {(1− δ) [1 + δ − δ(ρL + ρH)] (1− δρLr(pi))} =
(1− δρL)(1− δρH)[pii(pi)− pi∗] + pi∗δρL(1− r(pi)) [1 + δ − δ(ρH + ρL)] +
pi∗δ(1− ρL)(1− δρL) + pi∗(1− δρL)(1− δρH).
Collecting terms with pi∗ in the RHS and simplifying, this further reduces to
ΠCi (pi) {(1− δ) [1 + δ − δ(ρL + ρH)] (1− δρLr(pi))} =
(1− δρL)(1− δρH)[pii(pi)− pi∗] + pi∗ [1 + δ − δ(ρL + ρH)] (1− δρLr(pi)),
which directly implies the equation in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1. Diﬀerentiating Πˆi(pi) :=
pii(pi)−pi∗
1−δρLr(pi) with respect to pi and eliminating
the positive denominator leads to the ﬁrst order condition
∂pii(pi;p
∗(cH))
∂pi
[1− δρLr(pi;p∗(cH); k)] + δρL [pii(pi;p∗(cH))− pi∗] ∂r(pi;p
∗(cH); k)
∂pi
= 0,
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which has to be satisﬁed for pi = p
∗(cH).
Inserting the deﬁnition of pii(pi;p
∗(cH)) = (pi− cL)si(pi;p∗(cH)), this can be reformulated
to
[
si(pi;p
∗(cH)) + (pi − cL)∂si(pi;p
∗(cH))
∂pi
]
[1− δρLr(pi;p∗(cH); k)] + (16)
δρL [pii(pi;p
∗(cH))− pi∗] ∂r(pi;p
∗(cH); k)
∂pi
= 0,
One can now calculate that
∂r(pi;p
∗(cH); k)
∂pi
=
∂
[
1− F
(
(N−1)k
1−si(pi;p∗(cH))
)]
∂pi
= −f
(
(N − 1)k
1− si(pi;p∗(cH))
)
(N − 1)k
[1− si(pi;p∗(cH))]2
∂si(pi;p
∗(cH))
∂pi
,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from equation (6). Evaluated at p∗(cH), this expression simpliﬁes
to
αN
N − 1Nkf(Nk).
Moreover, r(p∗(cH);p∗(cH); k) is given by 1− F (Nk), as was already stated in equation (7).
Evaluating equation (16) at pi = p
∗(cH) thus gives[
1
N
+
(
1
αN
+ cH − cL
)
(−α)
]
[1− δρL + δρLF (Nk)] + δρL cH − cL
N
αN
N − 1Nkf(Nk) = 0.
Simplifying the squared bracket, canceling out the positive factor α(cH − cL), multiplying by
−(N − 1) and setting Nk = φ ﬁnally yields the expression in the proposition.
In order to prove Proposition 2, it is convenient to state the subsequent lemma ﬁrst. In all
of what follows, let u(pi) := pii(pi) − pi∗ and v(pi) := 1 − δρL + δρLF
(
(N−1)k∗
1−si(pi;p∗(cH))
)
, where
v(pi) > 0.
Lemma 2. For any set of parameters cH , cL, α, δ, ρL, N , some price level pi ≥ 0 can only be
a global maximizer of Πˆi(pi) if u(pi) > 0 and u
′(pi) < 0.
Proof. As Πˆi(p
∗(cH)) =
u(p∗(cH))
v(p∗(cH))
= ∆cNv(p∗(cH)) is strictly positive for any ∆c, it is clear that
only positive values of u(pi) = pii(pi) − pi∗ are candidates for a global maximizer of Πˆi(pi).
Moreover, note that Πˆ′i(pi) has the same sign has u
′(pi)v(pi)− u(pi)v′(pi). Hence, since v(pi) is
unambiguously positive, v′(pi) is unambiguously negative, and u(pi) is unambiguously positive
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over the relevant range for global maximizers (by the previous observation), it has to hold that
u′(pi) is strictly negative in order for u′(pi)v(pi)− u(pi)v′(pi) to be non-positive, which must be
the case for a global maximizer of Πˆi(pi).
Proof of Proposition 2. I will proceed in two steps. First, I will show that whenever V ar(θ˜) <(
3
6+16N−1δρL
)2
, at least one solution φ∗ = Nk∗ to equation (12) exists. Second, I will prove that
whenever a solution φ∗ exists and the demand threshold k is set accordingly, p∗(cH) must be a
global maximizer of ΠCi (pi), conditional that ∆c := cH − cL is suﬃciently small.
For the ﬁrst part, note ﬁrst that by continuity of F and f , a solution φ∗ to the equation
h(φ) = (N − 1) [1− δρL + δρLF (φ)] − δρLφf(φ) = 0 must exist whenever there exists some φˆ
such that h(φˆ) < 0, as h(0) = (N − 1)(1 − δρL) > 0. Next, observe that the left part of h(φ),
(N − 1) [1− δρL + δρLF (φ)], is bounded above by N − 1. Hence, it suﬃces to show that
∃φ : h˜(φ) := N − 1− δρLφf(φ) < 0.
Now, from Chebyshev's inequality, it is known that for z ≥ 1, at least 1− 1z2 of the probability
mass of any random variable must not be more than z standard deviations away from the mean.
Hence, if the aggregate-market-demand random variable θ˜ has a standard deviation of σ, at least
1− 1z2 of its probability mass must fall in the range [1− zσ, 1 + zσ].
As this interval has a length of 2zσ, the average probability density in this interval must at
least be given by
1− 1
z2
2zσ . At worst, the maximum density in this interval is then equal to the
average probability density (if all values in the interval have the same density), and therefore it
must hold that
max
φ∈[1−zσ,1+zσ]
φf(φ) ≥ (1− zσ)1−
1
z2
2zσ
.
Inserting this minimal maximum of φf(φ) into the condition from above, a solution to equa-
tion (12) is guaranteed whenever
N − 1− δρL(1− zσ)
1− 1z2
2zσ
< 0.
The bound on the variance in the proposition then simply follows by inserting the simple
(but generally not tight) value of z = 2 and rearranging for σ, which is the square root of the
variance. This proves the ﬁrst part of the statement.
For the second part, note that if φ∗ = Nk∗ solves equation (12) (p∗(cH) is a local extremum
of Πˆi(pi) =
u(pi)
v(pi)
), a suﬃcient condition for p∗(cH) to be a global maximizer of Πˆi(pi) is that this
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function is strictly concave over the (connected) range of all of its potential maximizers. Due to
Lemma 2, this range is characterized by values of pi such that u(pi) > 0 and u
′(pi) < 0.19
Next, it is easy to calculate that
Πˆ′′i (pi) =
[u′′(pi)v(pi)− u(pi)v′′(pi)] v(pi)2 − 2 [u′(pi)v(pi)− u(pi)v′(pi)] v(pi)v′(pi)
v(pi)4
,
which has the same sign as
[u′′(pi)v(pi)− u(pi)v′′(pi)] v(pi)− 2 [u′(pi)v(pi)− u(pi)v′(pi)] v′(pi) =
−2αv(pi)2 − u(pi)v′′(pi)v(pi)− 2u′(pi)v(pi)v′(pi) + 2u(pi) (v′(pi))2 .
For any set of parameters, over the range of potential maximizers of Πˆi(pi), this expression is
smaller than
−2αv(pi)2 − u(pi)
[
v′′(pi)v(pi)− 2 (v′(pi))2
]
,
which should be negative in order to guarantee strict concavity of Πˆi(pi) in the relevant region.
Hence, rearranging the last equation from above, a suﬃcient condition for p∗(cH) to be a
global optimizer of Πˆi(pi) is that
u(pi)
[(
v′(pi)
v(pi)
)2
− v
′′(pi)
2v(pi)
]
< α (17)
over the range of potential maximizers pi, given the model parameters.
Now, ﬁx any si ∈
(
1
N , 1
)
and note that whenever cL is suﬃciently close to cH (∆c < ∆c(si) :=
si− 1N
2α ), no ﬁrm will ever want to price so low that it obtains a market share larger than si.
20
As F (θ) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, it is easy to see that for any si < 1,
v(si) := max
pi∈[s−1i (si),s−1i (0)]
[(
v′(pi)
v(pi)
)2
− v
′′(pi)
2v(pi)
]
19The fact that this range is connected trivially follows from strict concavity of u(pi).
20The inequality in brackets is obtained by solving si(p
D; p∗(cH)) < si, where pD := 1αN +
cH+cL
2
is the
solution to the strictly concave program maxpi (pi − cL)si(pi; p∗(cH)).
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must be ﬁnite and independent of cL. Moreover, u(pi) is bounded above by maxpi u(pi) =
∆c
N +
α(∆c)2
4 , which can be made arbitrarily small as cL approaches cH . Hence, given a ﬁxed si,
equation (17) must be satisﬁed for all relevant pi if the following two conditions are met:
∆c < ∆c (si) and[
∆c
N
+
α(∆c)2
4
]
v(si) ≤ α.
In particular, this can always be achieved if cL is suﬃciently close to cH .
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